CHINESE IMMIGRATION INTO THE EU: NEW TRENDS, DYNAMICS AND IMPLICATIONS

Kevin Latham
Bin Wu

This project is funded by The European Union

A project implemented by Steinbeis GmbH & Co. KG für Technologietransfer
## Contents

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... 5

Foreword ........................................................................................................................... 7

Executive Summary .......................................................................................................... 9

1 Introduction: Chinese International Migration in the New Century .................. 12
   1.1 Research questions and methodology ................................................................. 13
   1.2 Chinese immigration into Europe: contextualising the new wave .............. 16
   1.3 New dynamics and trends in Chinese international migration in the new century ........................................................................................................... 19
       1.3.1 SOE reform ................................................................................................ 19
       1.3.2 China-Europe trade .................................................................................. 20
       1.3.3 Rising consumer power and inequalities in China .................................. 21
       1.3.4 The establishment of important new niche economic sectors .......... 23
       1.3.5 The development of illegal immigration routes .................................... 23
       1.3.6 The relaxation of immigration policies in key European countries .... 24
       1.3.7 Extensive family networks ..................................................................... 25
       1.3.8 The internationalisation of higher education ....................................... 25

2 New Trends and Profiles of Chinese Immigration into the EU .................. 26
   2.1 Chinese immigration: Member State profiles ............................................... 28
       2.1.1 Austria .................................................................................................... 29
       2.1.2 Belgium .................................................................................................. 29
       2.1.3 Bulgaria .................................................................................................. 30
       2.1.4 Cyprus .................................................................................................... 30
       2.1.5 The Czech Republic .............................................................................. 30
       2.1.6 Denmark ................................................................................................ 31
       2.1.7 Estonia ................................................................................................... 32
       2.1.8 Finland ................................................................................................... 32
       2.1.9 France .................................................................................................... 32
       2.1.10 Germany ............................................................................................... 33
       2.1.11 Greece .................................................................................................. 33
       2.1.12 Hungary ............................................................................................... 33
       2.1.13 Ireland ................................................................................................. 34
       2.1.14 Italy ...................................................................................................... 34
       2.1.15 Latvia ................................................................................................... 35
       2.1.16 Lithuania .............................................................................................. 35
       2.1.17 Luxembourg ........................................................................................ 35
3 Emerging Issues and Factors Affecting Chinese Immigration into the EU.....39
3.1 The impact of the global economic crisis: a general comment .......... 39
3.2 The impact of immigration policy changes in some countries .......... 41
3.3 The transformation of the Chinese immigrant economy and community… 43
3.4 Working conditions and forced labour in some Chinese businesses…… 45
3.5 Mobility and transnationality ......................................................... 46
3.6 The second generation, the Chinese language and Chinese education .... 47
3.7 Questions of integration and the role of new media ....................... 49

4 Conclusions, Policy Implications and Recommendations......................52

References ..........................................................................................55

Appendix A: Chinese Residents in EU Countries:
European Migration Network Data, 2001-09..............................................63

Appendix B: Chinese Residents in EU Countries:
Eurostat Data, 2001-10 .........................................................................64
Acknowledgements

Dr Wu and Dr Latham would like to thank ECRAN for the financial support of this research and for offering them the opportunity to work together on this project. ECRAN funding supported desk-based research for both researchers over the summer of 2011 as well as fieldwork in Italy and China. However, the project also benefits from previous empirical research undertaken in Veneto, Italy, and the East Midlands, UK, in the late 2000s, particularly in relation to low-skill and un-skilled migration. Those two projects were funded by the Padova University and local Councils of Venice and Padova (2006-2008, with the title: ‘Mobility and impacts of Chinese entrepreneurs in Veneto’), and the International Labour Organization (2009, with a project title of ‘Employment conditions of Chinese migrant workers in the UK’) respectively.

We would also like to take this opportunity to thank Professor Kerry Brown and Professor Lina Song for their support, encouragement and constructive comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Dr Wu would like to express his special thanks to Dr Valter Zanin at Padova University for the opportunity to conduct joint research in Veneto, Rogers Plan and Gao Yun from the International Labour Office in Geneva for their support of the research project in the East Midlands; Dr Zhong Darong from the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office.
of the State Council of China, and Kieran Gorman-Best from the Beijing Office of the International Organization for Migration for their support of his fieldwork in China; and Dr Jackie Sheehan and Lan Lo who joined and contributed to the project in the East Midlands. Dr Latham would like to thank all those informants who kindly gave their time to this project over the summer of 2011, especially those agreeing to sometimes time-consuming telephone interviews. He would like to thank all those at the Monash University Prato Centre for their help and support, in particular Professor Loretta Baldassar and Narelle MacAuliffe.
Foreword

Ethnic Chinese have been living in Europe for over a century and a half. They migrated as merchants, students and travellers in significant numbers from 1850 onwards. They introduced many Europeans to the cultures, languages and goods of Qing China and, from the start of the Republican period after the Xinhai Revolution of 1911-12, were active across Europe, in many cases establishing recognisable communities.

The modern pattern of migration from China to the EU is characterised by complexity, by different waves of people from different areas, many of them establishing communities in Europe built on the localities and cultures of home. In terms of economic activity, we have come a long way from what was once known as the ‘Chinese Takeaway’ phenomenon. Once, the catering and laundering trades were areas that many ethnic Chinese moved into. Today, there are communities of first, second, third and fourth generation Chinese, with particularities and differences in their economic behaviour and engagement in different kinds of activity across Europe.

As Kevin Latham and Bin Wu’s meticulous and granular study of recent patterns of migration shows, beyond the unhelpful racial stereotypes one often finds in public discourse about Chinese migrants, there are no easy generalisations that
can be made. We have been living in an era of great mobility for some time. Globalisation has impacted on labour, as well as the commodity and financial, markets. People move around the world with great ease. While particular regions of China, largely along the coast, were once responsible for generating the vast majority of Chinese migrants, one now finds waves of people movements motivated by different economic and cultural impulses across the country.

The ways in which the Chinese community figure in political, social and economic life across the EU differ too. In some Member States, the key area of activity has been textiles, in others manufacturing. The extraordinary increase in numbers of students from China over the last two decades has created new links and dynamics between countries.

Dr Latham and Dr Wu look across the EU at the status of recent Chinese migration, and are able to pick up different trends, some at the level of the state, others at the sub-regional level. Nevertheless, their study shows that there is great variation in the data. Some of this is due to the varying quality of statistics kept on the Chinese population. But much is reflective of the challenge of trying to keep track of such a fast changing situation. The only overall conclusion one can draw is that with economic, investment and political links increasing at all levels, all the time, the role of ethnic Chinese within the EU is only likely to increase in the years ahead. This diversity should be something that European policymakers and communities embrace and take value from.

Kerry Brown
Team Leader, ECRAN
March 2013
Executive Summary

Over the past decade there has been an accelerating trend of both inward and outward Chinese international migration, accompanied by a continuous high-rate growth of international flows and exchanges in investment, trade, technology and information between China and the rest of the world. Alongside these developments, Chinese immigration into the European Union has also been on the increase. This has led to the diversification of Chinese populations in Europe in their origin, economic activity and social, educational and economic background. In some countries that have experienced rapid growth in the Chinese population over a relatively short time, it has led to heightened social tension between Chinese and host communities. Measures are called for that can help to facilitate a more flexible and successful integration of Chinese communities into their European host contexts. Models and patterns of the integration of Chinese communities into countries with a longer history of Chinese immigration may offer useful insights as to how that integration may be facilitated in future.
The paper concludes that

1. Chinese immigration into the EU continues to rise, and will do so in the medium term. However, its rate of growth is slowing down. This trend will continue owing to the worsening economic environment and the decreasing economic opportunities in some of the countries hit hardest by the financial crises surrounding the euro, notably Italy and Spain, hosts to some of the continent’s largest Chinese populations;

2. Chinese communities in Europe are constantly changing and dynamic. There is a high degree of fluidity and mobility as well as interaction between different Chinese communities in different EU Member States with higher concentrations of activity in the countries with the largest Chinese populations: the UK, France, Italy, Germany and Spain;

3. The arrival of ‘new Chinese immigrants’, principally from Zhejiang and Fujian provinces since the 1990s but especially in the past decade, has transformed the character of many Chinese communities in Europe in terms of size, distribution, economic activity, language and culture and in relations with home communities in China;

4. Various important trends and issues in Chinese immigration into the EU have emerged since 2000 that have important implications for the future of Chinese communities in the EU, for relations between Chinese immigrants and local populations and for relations between China and the EU and its member countries. The key issues identified in this report for consideration are:
   - The mixed impacts of the global and European economic crises on Chinese immigration into Europe;
   - The importance of changes in immigration and other policies in different countries of the EU;
   - The continuing transformation of the Chinese business landscape and the nature of Chinese communities in many EU member countries;
   - Working conditions and forced labour in some Chinese businesses;
   - High degrees of mobility and transnationality among Chinese communities in Europe and beyond;
• The diversity of forms and levels of the integration of Chinese communities in Europe and the economic, social and political implications of encouraging harmonious integration in the future; and
• The increasing importance of Chinese professionals, highly skilled workers and international students for local Chinese community development and integration and for future relationships between EU countries and China.

Recent developments in Chinese migration to the EU and its relation to China’s rise on the world stage call for further research and methodological innovation in order to develop a holistic view and an in-depth understanding of the process, trends and impacts of Chinese immigration into the EU in the next 10 years.

In the light of the discussion and findings of this report, the authors make eight essential policy recommendations:

1. EU and Member State policies related to Chinese immigration into Europe need to pay careful attention to the specific local circumstances and constitution of each Chinese community there;
2. At the EU level, policies need to be formulated that help and encourage Chinese integration into Member States without imposing preformed ideas as to what ‘integration’ entails. The EU should identify and make available examples of best practices of community leadership, the development of good relationships with the local society, the formation of strong community identity and solidarity and the wide participation in community development among Chinese communities across Europe;
3. The EU should encourage and support member countries in the empowerment of Chinese immigrant workers and other vulnerable groups through the establishment of various voluntary support networks and mechanisms;
4. The EU should offer centralised support to Member States looking to better exploit the potential of Chinese-language new media as a fundamental way to engage and communicate with young Chinese immigrants and second-generation Chinese;
5. The EU should look, wherever possible, to coordinate at the European level policies related to Chinese immigration and to engagement with Chinese
communities in Europe and give support to Member States in their bilateral negotiations with China over immigration issues;

6. The EU should encourage and support regular roundtable conferences for the Chinese community’s development in significant host countries. This would allow all stakeholders to exchange views, explore areas of common concern and formulate mutually acceptable solutions to outstanding problems;

7. The EU should support universities’ engagement with Chinese societies in its Member States and encourage university-level research that will help to enhance the positive contributions that Chinese immigration can make to the EU and its host countries; and

8. The EU should support or host a Chinese immigration forum. This would bring together policymakers, scholars, Chinese-community leaders and other stakeholders for regular annual meetings.

1 Introduction: Chinese International Migration in the New Century

Over the past decade, the trend of both inward and outward Chinese international migration has accelerated. It has been accompanied by a continuous high-rate growth of international flows and exchanges in investment, trade, technology and information between China and the rest of the world. China’s rise on the world stage has provided an indispensable base for the success of diasporic businesses in Europe (Pastore and Castagnone, 2011: 8). Alongside the emergence of China as a major international player and its three decades of economic reform, there has been an increasing migration of Chinese people to Europe. Some seek political asylum, but most Chinese immigration to the EU is economic migration in quest of an opportunity to find work, to set up businesses and, in many cases, eventually to return to China, even if only in retirement.

The new wave of Chinese immigration into the EU following economic reform in China has come on top of earlier waves of Chinese immigration, notably post-Second World War migration to the UK and other northern European countries from Hong Kong and that of ethnic Chinese from Indochina to France. As a result, Europe’s Chinese ‘ethnoscape’ (see Appadurai 1990) has become increasingly complex and diversified in recent years, and Chinese communities
have become more diverse not only in origin, education, skills and migration experience but also in economic activity. The traditional primacy of the catering sector has been supplemented by fashion and leather goods manufacturing in some countries and by import-export businesses and wholesale and retail trading in others. In some countries, these core activities have now been further supplemented by a range of other businesses, from nail bars to Chinese medicine outlets.

The main focus of this paper is on developments and trends in Chinese immigration into the EU over the past decade. However, it is not possible to understand the complexity and diversity of the present without some attention to the historical development of Europe’s Chinese populations. Some historical perspective is necessary in order to contextualise those changes. It is necessary as well to understand the diverse histories of different Chinese populations in Europe, which include immigrants from different parts of China migrating in different historical periods and with diverse motivations and methods.

The next section outlines the methodology and objectives of this paper. It will be followed by a section contextualising Chinese immigration into Europe and then a section focusing in more detail on its recent trends and developments.

1.1 Research questions and methodology

This research asks three major questions: what have been the main changes, new trends and features of Chinese immigration into EU member countries since 2000? What are the key factors driving the changing profile of Chinese international migration in general and influencing Chinese immigration into the EU in particular? What are the policy implications for coping with the new trends in Chinese immigration and integration?

In the rest of this paper we address the above questions through a review of official information, through an interpretation of data from fieldwork conducted by one of the authors in Italy (Veneto, 2006), China (Wenzhou, 2006) and the UK (the East Midlands, 2009) and by the other author in Italy (Prato, 2011) and through a review of the latest research findings of other scholars both in the EU and China. Accordingly, the paper aims to:

- Draw a general picture of Chinese immigration into the EU;
• Examine the new trends and characteristics of Chinese immigration since 2000 in terms of type, status and distribution by major destination;

• Identify the key issues, factors and dynamics related to Chinese immigration and integration into the EU; and

• Highlight a number of policy issues for scholars and policymakers to deal with in relation to Chinese migration to the EU.

Additional fieldwork was conducted by the authors in China and Italy in 2011 in order to collect updated information and, where possible, to verify research findings. This fieldwork principally consisted of conducting structured and semi-structured interviews with Chinese association representatives (e.g., Chinese native-place associations in Europe, business associations etc.), EU and European national government officials or representatives, Chinese government officials at the local and national levels and scholars from Europe and China working on Chinese international migration and immigration into Europe. Those contacted included the Capacity Building for Migration Management in China (CBMM China) Project Office in Beijing and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council of China. A number of experts and research centres in Guangdong, Wenzhou, Shanghai and Beijing were also contacted. Face-to-face interviews were supplemented where necessary with telephone or email interviews. Alongside contacts and interviews with key informants and experts, we undertook a systematic collection of secondary data and the latest relevant publications in English, Chinese and Italian. These included published work available in academic libraries, materials available on the Internet, pertinent conference papers and EU and national government reports. Two international conferences attended by the authors were especially beneficial in the preparation of this paper: ‘Reflections from Prato/Europe: Chinese economic and social integration around the world’ (Prato, Italy 20–23 September 2011) and ‘New perspectives on labour disputes in globalised China’ (Vienna, 22–24 September 2011).

In order to compile the statistical data presented in this report, the following sources were used, where available: European Union and European Commission reports and statistical datasets publicly available online or in published documents, e.g. the EC’s Eurostat website; the annual reports of the European Migration Network; statistical reports and data published by EU national governments and by China; published statistical data in academic
works in Chinese, English and Italian on Chinese migration and immigration into Europe; and data from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.

The compilation of statistical data for this report was problematic, for five reasons:

1. The definitions and methodologies adopted by different sources of statistical data vary greatly. What was counted in different surveys as a Chinese immigrant was not consistent; and although definitions were sometimes specified, in many cases they were not. Among the sources of variation were the inclusion or exclusion of Chinese with different kinds of visa or work permit status, differences in immigration law among EU states with different visa and work permit systems and a lack of clarity over the definition of ‘Chinese’ in many cases, for instance only PRC citizens, including or excluding Chinese from Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan etc. There could also be confusion stemming from differences between figures, e.g. for the Chinese population of a country (which might include naturalised immigrants and second- or third-generation Chinese, according to an ‘ethnic’ definition of Chinese) and figures related to Chinese immigrants (which could be very narrowly defined in some cases, e.g. citizens of the PRC with official leave to stay in the country);

2. Many statistics compiled by national governments appear not to have been regularly or systematically updated (e.g. in Eurostat figures sometimes the same figure for Chinese immigrants may appear for one country for several years in succession), putting in doubt the accuracy and validity of the data;

3. The inclusion or exclusion of Chinese students in immigration figures was inconsistent across different data sources. In some cases, it was unclear whether or not students were included;

4. Comparable figures for all countries were not always available for all years. There were significant gaps in national and EU datasets; and

5. It is impossible to compile accurate figures on levels of illegal immigrants. Given the very high levels of illegal immigration into the EU in recent decades and the exclusion of illegal immigrants in official figures, all figures for the number of Chinese people in Europe are inevitably imprecise.
As a consequence, the statistical data presented in this report can be taken only as indicative estimates of likely levels of Chinese immigration into the EU, not as accurate figures. Indeed, the authors would contend that it is impossible to compile accurate figures for the number of Chinese immigrants in the EU. However, they do stand by the figures presented in this report as probably among the most reliable scholarly estimates currently available. These figures have been compiled by comparing figures from the various data sources and making an informed judgement on the most reliable figures available. Where gaps in the data were present, figures have been extrapolated from available data, taking into account the trends and chief factors affecting Chinese immigration in the relevant contexts, such as those outlined in sections 1.3 and 3 below.

1.2 Chinese immigration into Europe: contextualising the new wave

Chinese immigration into Europe is not new. It can be traced back to the First Opium War (1839–41), when China was forced to open its doors to the Western world. This initiated a process of recruitment of contract labourers via the Chinese coolies trade system and other channels, resulting in more and more migrant workers, especially Chinese seamen, settling down in European countries (Pieke, 1998: 3–9). Many of these early immigrants settled in northern Europe — in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. During the First World War, more than 100,000 Chinese labourers were recruited to dig trenches in France and Belgium, but the majority of them subsequently returned to China.

The next large wave of Chinese migration to Europe came after the Second World War, when thousands of Chinese, from Hong Kong in particular, moved to the UK and some neighbouring European countries for the most part to open Chinese restaurants and later take-away food outlets. This migration continued to the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. In the 1970s, another wave of immigration began in the wake of the Vietnam war, which saw thousands of ethnic Chinese flee Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Many of them found their way to Europe, above all France, the former colonial power. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, there was very little international immigration from mainland China owing to strict travel controls in China itself
and to curbs on immigration from the PRC in European countries during the Cold War period.

Thanks to Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform and ‘open door’ policies introduced in the late 1970s, international migration from China gained a new momentum. The ‘new wave’ of Chinese international migration that started in the late 1980s is generally recognised as distinct from preceding ones. Certainly the new wave of immigrants into the EU came from different sending communities and displayed a variety of skills and educational backgrounds (Wang and Zhuang, 2010: 51-61; Li, 2011a).

Table 1 shows a rapid growth in the overseas Chinese population worldwide, from an estimated 27 million in 1980 to 40 million in 2000 and 45.43 million in 2007, an increase of nearly 18.5 million over this period, equivalent to a 2.5 per cent average annual growth. The major contributing factor to this growth, according to Gui (2011), is the new wave of Chinese international migration. According to Guo Chaojin, the director of the Chinese News Agency, it was 2.2 million in the period from 1980 to 2000. It then jumped to a total of 6 million by 2009 (Qu et al., 2011: 21).

As for the origin of the new migrant workers, 1.1 million came from Fujian, 1.45 million from Zhejiang and 1.0 million from Guangdong, according to Guo. A further 500,000 came from Shanghai, 300,000 each from Beijing and Tianjin and 400,000 from northeastern China (Qu et al., 2011: 21). Caution may be necessary regarding the accuracy of these estimates, as official statistics do not take illegal migrant workers into account even though that group accounts for a considerable portion of new wave Chinese international migration from coastal regions of China such as Fujian and Zhejiang. Indeed, in research conducted by the Fujian Provincial Office for Overseas Chinese Affairs and Xiamen University (2002–03), it was found that new Chinese migrants from Fujian numbered between 900,000 and 1 million by the early 2000s, of which 40 per cent to 50 per cent went abroad via irregular channels (Qu et al., 2011: 21).

Of the distribution of the overseas Chinese population, Table 1 shows that Europe accounts for only a small proportion of the total, less than 5 per cent by 2007, ranking third after Asia and the Americas. But if we consider the growth rate of the various Chinese populations, we find by contrast that Chinese immigration into Europe has grown rapidly over the past three decades. Its rise from 600,000 in 1980 to 2.15 million in 2007 was an increase of 3.5 times, much
higher than the average global growth rate of 0.68 times. As a result, Europe is ranked second in growth rate, just behind Africa.

Table 1: Global growth distribution of the overseas Chinese population since 1980 (million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>24.764</td>
<td>91.81</td>
<td>32.942</td>
<td>82.85</td>
<td>35.48</td>
<td>78.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>1.333</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>4.333</td>
<td>10.90</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>13.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>0.622</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>1.454</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>4.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.786</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>2.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26.972</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>39.76</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>45.43</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: authors’ extrapolation from three tables in Gui (2011: 54–55).

This shifting trend indicates that, firstly, Europe has become an increasingly important and attractive destination for Chinese migrants since the 1980s and that, secondly, new migrants constitute an increasingly large and significant proportion of the total number of Chinese immigrants in Europe. The increasing importance of Europe as the preferred destination of the new wave of Chinese international migration is illustrated in Table 2. In it we can see that new immigrants accounted for 79 per cent of local Chinese communities in Europe in 2006–07, which is much higher than the 22.7 per cent world average. Consequently, the new wave of Chinese immigrants has transformed the make-up of Europe’s Chinese population over the past two decades.

Table 2: Percentage of new immigrants in the global overseas Chinese population, 2006–07

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of new migrants (million)</th>
<th>Percentage of new migrants in total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>11.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>55.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>79.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>63.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>90.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World total</td>
<td>10.30</td>
<td>22.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gui (2011: 62)
1.3 New dynamics and trends in Chinese international migration in the new century

Having identified an acceleration of Chinese international migration to Europe over most of the decade since 2000, we identify in this section the crucial factors that have brought a new momentum to Chinese international migration in general and specifically to Europe over the past decade. They include a combination of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors that encourage migrants to leave China while attracting them to Europe. Those factors are as follows:

- State-owned enterprise (SOE) reform;
- The rapid growth of international trade between China and Europe;
- The strong growth of the Chinese people’s income and consumption;
- The unequal distribution of wealth and the benefits of economic reform in China;
- The establishment of key niche economic sectors;
- The development of illegal immigration routes;
- The relaxation of immigration policies in key European countries;
- Extensive family networks, often reaching across several European countries; and
- The internationalisation of higher education.

1.3.1 SOE reform

In the late 1990s, SOE reform led to the closure or transfer of hundreds of thousands of small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises to private or joint venture firms and the redundancy of tens of millions of SOE employees (CLIN, 1999). Its consequences varied greatly from region to region: northeastern China, the country’s heavy industrial heartland, crowded with SOE workers, was one of the most seriously affected regions. The vast majority of redundant workers were forced to migrate to other regions of China or to seek employment in the service sector, but a large number of former SOE employees also went abroad, mainly to Europe, in search of alternative business and job opportunities (Blanchard and Maffeo, 2011: 74–75). Many but not all of them went to Hungary and neighbouring countries in eastern Europe, in part owing to the relatively relaxed visa requirements in Hungary at that time and to the
previous political links between China and the formerly communist Hungary. This has resulted in a partial reshaping of the Chinese immigration landscape in Europe in terms of both local Chinese labour supply and Chinese community structure from the perspective of the geographical location of sending communities in mainland China.

As a result, the proportion of Europe’s Chinese immigrant population from China’s Dongbei (the Northeast) has been growing rapidly, making people from that region a more prominent and influential group in Chinese communities than they were in the past given the predominance of new immigrants from Zhejiang and Fujian provinces and, in some countries, of ‘old’ immigrants from Hong Kong and Indochina. These immigrants have been found often to prefer labour models different from those favoured by the more entrepreneurial Zhejiangese and Fujianese. Northeasterners, largely from Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang, often prefer paid employment with host-country employers rather than the established entrepreneurial career path taken by many of their compatriots (Blanchard and Maffeo, 2011). In Italy, according to our observation of 28 Chinese-owned factories in the garment sector in Veneto for instance, the vast majority of Dongbeinese were manual workers (zhagong) and a few were skilled workers (chegong). No entrepreneurs were found (Zanin and Wu, 2009).

1.3.2 China-Europe trade
China’s rise in the international community has seen an increasing interconnection and interdependence between China and Europe in all fields. This includes international trade and mutual investment, which has provided a sound base and strong demand for international migration. From 1999 to 2009, international trade between China and Europe increased 6.26 times, from US$68.1 billion to US$427 billion, slightly faster than the average total growth rate of China’s total international trade. Foreign direct investment (FDI) from Europe to China has remained fairly constant, increasing by only 15 percent over this period even though the total scale of FDI has doubled. By contrast, there has been a rapid growth of outward direct investment (ODI) from China to Europe, from just US$500 million in 2005 to over US$3 billion in 2009, an increase of 6.6 times in just four years and outstripping the total average ODI growth of 4.6 times.
It is beyond the scope of this research to establish a causal link between increasing trade and Chinese migration to the EU. However, it is possible to identify how the rapid development of China-Europe economic collaboration in the past decade has had a profound impact on Chinese international migration to Europe in several ways. Firstly, it has led to an adjustment of Chinese ethnic economies in host countries as Chinese immigrants have sought to exploit the new opportunities that China’s rise and the growth of international trade with it have brought. There has been a diversification of Chinese business interests away from the traditional catering sector to other areas of commerce, manufacturing and personal services (Pastore and Castagnone, 2011: 9). These include shops for Chinese products and services (Cologna, 2011) ranging from everyday items and hardware to traditional Chinese medicine and to services for the increasing number of Chinese tourists and delegations coming to Europe (Arlt, 2011). Secondly, it has created new demands for Chinese international migration in order to fill job vacancies in different sectors in local Chinese communities and beyond. For instance, many Europe-based small Chinese businesses, such as the tailoring and leather-goods manufacturers in Italy and France, employ Chinese staff almost entirely. And increasing business, which often means greater imports of materials from China, also means increasing staff and in turn greater demand for immigrants (Ma, 2011).

1.3.3 Rising consumer power and inequalities in China
China’s increasing importance on the global stage results from the rapid growth of not only its economic power and influence in the world economic system but also the purchasing power of Chinese citizens at home owing to the substantial growth in wages and household incomes and the associated increase in consumer spending power (Atsmon et al., 2010; BCG 2010). The growth of its economic power can be seen from the increase of its GDP per capita (see Table 3) from Rmb7,159 in 1999 to Rmb25,575 in 2009, an increase of nearly four times in 10 years. Meanwhile, incomes have also risen, by between 2.3 (rural) and 2.9 (urban) times on average. The rapid growth of income, particularly among China’s emerging middle classes (Anagnost 1998; Tomba 2004; Zhang 2008), has increased demand for products and services in or from Europe, contributing in some cases to further growth in Chinese migration to Europe.

Two new phenomena reflect this increasing demand. One is the increasing popularity of outbound tourism (Arlt 2006; CASS, 2011; CTA, 2011; Latham,
2011a): more and more Chinese tourists have been visiting Europe in recent years. In 2010, trips to Europe, which numbered around 3.1 million, accounted for more than 20 percent of all Chinese outbound tourism (excluding travel to Hong Kong and Macao) (ITB, 2011). Official statistics also foresee an annual growth in outbound tourism of between 15 and 20 percent over the next few years (CTA, 2011). This tourism is strongly associated with the consumption of luxury goods (Moore, 2011) and also with investment migration and property purchasing in European cities such as London, Paris and Milan. The second phenomenon is the rapid growth in the number of Chinese international students in many European countries. This growth is not limited to English-speaking countries (see below).

Table 3: Growth of income and inequality in China, 1999–2009 (yuan per capita)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP per capita</th>
<th>Urban income</th>
<th>Rural income</th>
<th>Urban/rural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>7,159</td>
<td>5,854</td>
<td>2,210</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>8,622</td>
<td>6,860</td>
<td>2,366</td>
<td>2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>10,542</td>
<td>8,472</td>
<td>2,622</td>
<td>3.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>14,185</td>
<td>10,493</td>
<td>3,255</td>
<td>3.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>20,169</td>
<td>13,786</td>
<td>4,140</td>
<td>3.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>25,575</td>
<td>17,175</td>
<td>5,153</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although the vast majority of Chinese citizens have gained in some way from China’s rise, the distribution of the benefits of its economic development have been quite uneven, with economic and social inequality increasing between different social groups. As Table 3 shows, rural incomes continue to rise at a slower rate than urban incomes.

This uneven development has been closely associated with increasing rural-to-urban migration in China (Pieke and Mallee, 1999; Sun, 2007), and it has two important consequences for international migration. Firstly, social inequality and discrimination, for instance against rural-to-urban migrant workers (Pun, 2003; Yan, 2003), is a major factor driving some Chinese people, including both rural and urban residents, to seek economic opportunities in Europe (Christiansen, 2003), even via illegal channels. Secondly, the authors’ fieldwork in Europe has found that income inequalities, which reflect social stratification and labour market segregation in China, have also influenced economic and social structures in overseas Chinese communities in Europe, resulting in poor
working conditions and forced labour in some European Chinese businesses. For example, migrant workers have almost no voice, as overseas Chinese communities are dominated by successful businessmen who have established many Chinese associations to represent their interests rather than those of Chinese workers.

1.3.4 The establishment of important new niche economic sectors
The past two decades have seen the emergence of important new niche economic sectors for Chinese immigrants in Europe. They are outside the already established Chinese catering industry and have become increasingly consolidated. They include off-the-peg clothing fashion manufacturing and distribution, leather-goods production, particularly for the fashion industry, the rise of Chinese import-export businesses and the wholesale distribution of Chinese-made goods and products. These businesses have created many new opportunities for employment, business development and mobility for Chinese migrant workers and small-business people in Europe. In Italy, Chinese immigrants from the Wenzhou and Qingtian areas of Zhejiang Province arriving in the early 1990s set up small manufacturing workshops. Initially, they relied upon collaboration with and servicing Italian companies in the same sector. However, as Chinese businesses became more successful, they expanded their activities and came to dominate entire supply chains in the sector (Pieraccini, 2008). With fashion, Chinese businesses managed to exploit the appeal of the ‘Made in Italy’ label throughout Europe and built up a substantial niche presence in the provinces of Naples and Prato, for instance. Some businesses set up similar operations in France, but in recent years Chinese fashion manufacturing in Europe has become increasingly centred upon Italy.

Chinese import-export and wholesale businesses have similarly sprung up in Milan as well as in the suburbs of Paris and Madrid. These businesses rely upon the popularity across Europe of cheap Chinese goods, from toys to clothing and shoes to household hardware. These businesses supply Chinese shops and traders throughout Europe and indigenous retail businesses.

1.3.5 The development of illegal immigration routes
In the 1990s and early 2000s, the development of illegal immigration routes and structures of operation facilitated the illegal immigration of Chinese into many European countries. Illegal operations, run by ‘snake-heads’ from Fujian
and Zhejiang provinces in southeastern China, smuggled immigrants via a number of routes through the Middle East, eastern Europe and, in some cases, via Africa and South America. These operations often offered work and accommodation in the destination country in exchange for large sums of money either paid up front in China or contracted as debts to be paid off through labour on arrival.

Illegal immigration was not an easy way into Europe, and could involve many dangers and risks for the smuggled people, including exploitation by the ‘snake-head’ gangs, treacherous sea and land journeys that could end in death and the risk of discovery and deportation by European or other authorities. But for many poor Chinese those gangs, by circumventing legal requirements and processes, offered a possibility of immigration that previously did not exist (Denison et al., 2009:2).

But in the late 2000s, evidence suggests that illegal Chinese immigration, particularly people-smuggling, has been in decline (Wu, Guo and Sheehan, 2010). This can be related to the increasing number of alternative, safer ways of reaching Europe legally.

1.3.6 The relaxation of immigration policies in key European countries

The relaxation of immigration policies and the offer of mass amnesties for illegal immigrants, notably in Spain and Italy, have encouraged and facilitated Chinese immigration into Europe (Blanchard and Maffeo, 2011: 70; Ceccagno and Rastrelli, 2008; Denison et al., 2009). Spain has offered six amnesties over the past 20 years. The latest, in 2005, attracted more than 700,000 applications for the legalisation of status, a 15-fold increase on the 44,000 applying in the first amnesty (Sandford, 2010). Repeated and regular amnesties have attracted illegal immigrants from other European countries as well as China (Soothill, 2010). This observation is supported by evidence from interviews with Chinese business people and workers as well as immigration officials in Italy and the UK. Academic researchers have also reported a perceived decrease in illegal emigration among emigrant communities in the Wenzhou region of Zhejiang (Castagnone and Blanchard, 2011). But in view of the lack of statistical data on illegal immigration, it is impossible to verify this trend conclusively.

2 By contrast to other northern European countries, France also instituted several ‘regularisation’ programmes offering legal status to irregular immigrants. Since 1973, there have been six programmes – in 1973, 1980, 1981–82, 1991, 1997–98 and 2006). The most important of these, in 1981–82, saw 130,000 of the estimated 150,000 irregular immigrants in the country at the time acquire regular status (Kofman, Rogoz and Lévy, 2010: 8).
What is more, owing to the repetition of amnesties every few years, they have held out the hope to illegal immigrants of legalising their status in the future (Denison et al., 2009: 3). Associated with immigration policies are asylum and welfare policies. They can, if seen as favourable to immigrants, be a magnet for those looking to exploit state safety nets.

1.3.7 Extensive family networks
It is not new for Chinese migrants to rely on family and native-place networks for support when migrating in search of work or for setting up a new business. This is true both in China and overseas. But given the strong growth of the new migrant Chinese population in Europe since the 1990s, these networks are now becoming well established and consolidated, offering migrants well-developed means of support when they arrive in Europe (Blanchard and Maffeo, 2011: 68–69). In some cases, this can also make it easier to avoid the illegal ‘snake-head’ migration routes that were used more extensively in the 1990s and early 2000s.

1.3.8 The internationalisation of higher education
The number of Chinese students coming to the EU has shown strong growth in the past decade. Chinese student numbers in the EU in 2010 were approximately six times those in 2000 (GHK, 2011: 18). It is difficult to give precise figures for student numbers but national statistics compiled by the European Commission and the Chinese Ministry of Education suggest that there are around 120,000 Chinese students in the EU, spread approximately as following: the UK, 40 per cent; France, 23 per cent; Germany, 20 per cent; the Netherlands, 4 per cent; Italy, Ireland and Sweden, 3 per cent each; and between 1 per cent and 2 per cent in Finland, Cyprus and Denmark (GHK, 2011: 18). However, this figure should be taken as indicative rather than as a precise representation of student numbers, and more generous estimates would put it nearer 200,000. These students come almost entirely from China’s growing middle classes, who now find themselves with sufficient disposable income to send their children overseas to study. Many Chinese students return to China on completion of their studies but employment opportunities in the EU entice many to stay on. Consequently, the trend towards increasing numbers of

---

1 There is much variation between definitions used to identify and count students across different EU countries, and in some cases there is a considerable lack of clarity as to how national statistics have been compiled. For a detailed discussion of the methodological difficulties associated with counting Chinese student numbers in the EU, see GHK (2011: 19–22).
Chinese students in the EU is also contributing to larger numbers of highly educated and white-collar immigrants.  

2 New Trends and Profiles of Chinese Immigration into the EU

According to estimates by Chinese scholars and the authors of this report (see Table 4), the total overseas Chinese population in Europe has reached more than 2.5 million, of which more than 2.3 million or 86 per cent live in EU countries. However, as Table 4 makes clear, the distribution of Chinese in the EU is very uneven. Some 95 per cent are concentrated in the top 10 countries by size of Chinese population: the UK, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Germany, Ireland, Austria, Belgium and Portugal. In addition, more than 72 per cent are concentrated in the top four countries. This is due partly to the colonial history of the UK and France and to the work, benefits and commercial opportunities available in those four states. Italy and Spain have implemented amnesties for illegal immigrants over the past couple of decades, as noted above, and Italy has been a convenient place for Chinese to conduct business, particularly in the grey and black markets.

---

4 According to the Chinese Ministry of Education, of the 1,067,000 students who came to the EU to study between 1978 and 2006, only 275,000 returned to China (GHK, 2011:40). However, the trend in recent years has been for a larger proportion of students to return home on completing their studies. The China Scholarship Council reported in 2009 that more than 50 per cent of Chinese students studying overseas did return to China (China Scholarship Council 2009). But even though a higher proportion of students may be returning to China, the growing number of overseas students means that there are still large numbers who remain in the EU.

5 In this table, ‘Chinese’ refers broadly to people of Chinese ethnic origin, including older generations of Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong and Indochina.
Table 4: Growth and distribution of the Chinese population in Europe, 1998–2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>630,000</td>
<td>Growing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>540,000</td>
<td>Growing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>330,000</td>
<td>Slowing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>168,000</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>Slowing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>Growing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>127,500</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>Growing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>Growing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>20,000²</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>Slowing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>12,800</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>Slowing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>Dropping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>12,800</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>Slowing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>Growing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>Dropping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>16,320</td>
<td>19,970</td>
<td>24,200</td>
<td>Growing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU subtotal</td>
<td>939,720</td>
<td>2,153,970</td>
<td>2,307,200</td>
<td>Growing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU</td>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>60,500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>228,000</td>
<td>360,500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe: total</td>
<td>1,167,720</td>
<td>2,514,470</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ The figures in this column have been compiled according to the methodology explained in section 1.1. For comparative purposes, figures from Eurostat and the European Migration Network are provided in appendices A and B. However, these tables refer not to ethnic Chinese but to PRC residents in EU Member States.

² Li Minghuan’s figure for 1998 of 41,000 has been replaced here by an estimate based upon Chinese figures from the Guangdong government (GDBIP, 2009). These figures seem more in keeping with the broader trends indicated in this table and with other scholarly estimates (see, e.g., Ohio University Libraries, 2011).

Sources: 2008 data are based upon an estimate by the European Chinese Association. The 1998 data are from Minghuan Li, ‘Analysis of Chinese population in Contemporary Europe’. Both sets are quoted in Qu et al., 2011: 23, 57. The 2011 figures have been compiled by the authors of this report. Although the ultimate accuracy of these figures is always questionable, it is reasonable to believe that Table 4 reliably shows the key trends and distribution patterns of Chinese immigration to Europe over the past decade.
The major driving force behind the rapid growth of the Chinese population in Europe in the past decade has been international migration rather than reproduction. The newly emerging destinations for Chinese immigration have been the so-called peripheral countries of southern Europe (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain), where growth rates over the decade were much higher than the EU average of 129 per cent. Ironically, in the current climate of economic difficulty these countries are likely to see some of the fastest slowdowns in growth over the next few years as Chinese immigrants with choice and flexibility look either to stronger European economies or beyond the EU for better economic, employment and commercial opportunities.

A number of important factors have driven the growth of Chinese immigration to the EU in the new century (see above). But since the global economic crisis hit in 2008, we can also identify contrasting trends, including the slowing down of migration to previously popular European destinations such as Italy, Spain and Portugal; some internal migration to other, stronger European economies (e.g., France, Germany and the Netherlands); and some outward migration and diversion of new immigrants to other, more promising destinations such as South Africa, Brazil and parts of Southeast Asia (De Pretto, 2011). For these reasons, we see slower growth for some countries than for others for 2011 in Table 4.

Furthermore, it is important to recognise the variations between different Chinese populations in Europe. Since 2000, Chinese populations there have been constantly transforming themselves in terms of who the immigrants are, the degree and nature of their integration into their community and their economic activity, political participation, self-representation and media use. However, none of these factors are constant across all Chinese immigrant populations in the EU, and each has to be understood in terms of its own social, political, economic and historic context.

2.1 Chinese immigration: Member State profiles
In order to illustrate some of these differences, we present below brief country profiles of Chinese immigration into the 27 EU member countries.
2.1.1 Austria
Austria’s Chinese population has risen sharply in recent years. In 2004, there were an estimated 25,000 Chinese in the country, double from around 12,000 in 1995 (GDBiP, 2009). In 2011, the Chinese population was estimated to be some 40,000. Official figures put the number of PRC citizens resident in Austria at 9,664 in 2009 (see Appendix 2). The majority of Chinese immigrants are from the Qingtian, Wencheng and Wenzhou regions of Zhejiang Province on China’s east coast, which accounts for around 70 percent of the Chinese population. The remainder are largely from Fujian, Shanghai and northeastern China.

The principal economic activity of Chinese migrants in Austria is catering. But since the 1990s, the make-up of the Chinese community has undergone significant changes as migrants from better-educated social groups, many of them overseas students who have remained, started to arrive in greater numbers. These groups include engineers, technology workers, teachers, doctors, nurses, musicians and artists. With economic difficulties in much of Europe from 2008, Austria remains one of the more attractive destinations for Chinese immigrants. However, numbers there are not likely to grow greatly over the next few years.

Several large overseas Chinese organisations provide support services and networking opportunities, and they organise cultural, sporting and educational activities too. Major Chinese corporations investing in Austria include the Chinese shipping group COSCO (China Ocean Shipping [Group] Company) and the telecoms technology companies Huawei and ZTE. Each helps to boost Chinese immigration to some degree.

2.1.2 Belgium
There are an estimated 45,000 Chinese residents in Belgium, and the Chinese community there is intertwined with the large Chinese communities in neighbouring France and the Netherlands. In the current economic climate, this has helped to maintain the level of Chinese immigrants in the country. From the 1990s onwards, there was a new wave of immigration, largely from the Wenzhou and Qingtian regions of Zhejiang Province, but it also included migrants from areas with a less well-established history of overseas migration such as Fujian and northeastern China. In recent years, applications from China for student visas in Belgium, numbering around 3,000 in 2008, have been on the increase.
2.1.3 Bulgaria
Estimates of the size of the Chinese community in Bulgaria range between 5,000 and 10,000 people. The authors of this report estimate that their number in 2011 was approximately 9,000. Bulgarian media sources have suggested that as many as 3,000 Chinese arrive in Bulgaria each year, but this figure is probably an overestimation. Most Chinese immigrants have arrived in Bulgaria since the late 1980s, and particularly after the democratic changes beginning in 1989. The majority of the Chinese community lives in the capital Sofia and is concentrated largely in the neighbourhoods of Nadezhda, Tolstoy and Svoboda. Unlike some other Chinese communities in Europe, the majority of Chinese in Bulgaria come from cities in China, chiefly in the provinces of Zhejiang and Fujian and to a lesser extent from Sichuan, Beijing, Hong Kong and northeastern China, including Jilin and Shandong provinces.

The most common economic activity of Chinese in Bulgaria is catering, but there is also a sizeable number in retail and wholesale businesses. Smaller numbers are involved in trade in Chinese art, traditional Chinese medicine and agricultural production for Chinese restaurants. A recent growth in Chinese tourism to eastern Europe has opened up new opportunities for Chinese immigrants in Bulgaria. The main factors attracting Chinese immigration there are the relatively uncompetitive commercial environment, which offers more economic opportunities than in some other European countries, the relatively low cost of living and reasonable standards of living, including comfortable living space.

2.1.4 Cyprus
The Chinese population in Cyprus is estimated at fewer than 100 and is of little significance for this report.

2.1.5 The Czech Republic
The old Czechoslovakia had a small Chinese community before the Second World War, made up largely of Christians from Wenzhou in Zhejiang Province. In the post-war period, most moved out of the country to western Europe. In the 1980s, after China’s opening up and economic reform policies came into effect at home, more Chinese migrants headed for eastern Europe. They were attracted to Hungary, which for several years offered visa-free immigration to mainland Chinese nationals. When this policy was ended in the early 1990s,
immigrants began moving instead to neighbouring countries, including what were to become the Czech and Slovak Republics.

Some 60 percent of the estimated 8,000 Chinese living in the former Czechoslovakia reside in Prague, with the remainder mainly in other cities in the two countries. The community includes many white-collar urban migrants, former civil servants and employees of state-owned enterprises looking to make their fortune in business overseas, as opposed to the poor rural migrants often found in other countries. The bulk of them come from Zhejiang, Shanghai and Beijing. The Czech Republic was for a short time in the early 1990s a popular stopping-off point for illegal Chinese immigrants entering Europe over land (Nyiri, 2003). However, Chinese immigration to the Czech Republic has slowed down in recent years as neighbouring countries have become more popular.

2.1.6 Denmark

Until the 1980s, Denmark had only a very small Chinese community, fewer than 200 residents, even though the first reported Chinese in the country arrived at the beginning of the twentieth century. With economic reform in China and after the crackdown on student demonstrators in Beijing in 1989, Chinese immigration to Denmark started to grow. Estimates of the Chinese population in the country in 2009 range from just under 10,000 to around 18,000 (Li, 2011b).

Despite Denmark often being considered a relatively ‘soft’ option for asylum-seekers and for its welfare benefits, the indications are that Chinese immigrants to Europe prefer other European destinations, probably for the better employment and business opportunities in countries such as France, Spain, Italy, Germany and the UK. The majority of Chinese immigrants work in the catering industry; but as the Chinese restaurant market became increasingly competitive in the 1990s, more Chinese diversified into other areas of business, including traditional Chinese medicine, import-export trade, hairdressing and retail. Denmark has become a popular destination for Chinese tourists in recent years, largely owing to the popularity in China of Hans Christian Andersen’s fairy tales.
2.1.7 Estonia
Estonia has a small population of Chinese immigrants. They have arrived largely since the early 1990s and work in Chinese restaurants. The community is estimated to number several hundred, an insignificant percentage of Chinese immigration into Europe.

2.1.8 Finland
Finland has a relatively small Chinese population of around 2,000 people, most arriving in the past two decades and living in Helsinki and working in the catering trade.

2.1.9 France
France has one of the oldest Chinese communities in Europe. It dates back to the First World War, when 140,000 Chinese were brought to Europe to work as labourers in the war effort. After the war, around 3,000 Chinese remained in France, setting up the first Chinese quarter in the Twelfth District of Paris. The Chinese population in France now is estimated to be between 500,000 and 600,000, about one percent of the French population. The authors of this report estimate the figure to be around 540,000.

Between 60 percent and 70 percent of French Chinese come from Zhejiang Province, principally from the Wenzhou and Qingtian areas (Wang and Zhang, 2008: 52–53). However, in recent years a significant proportion of Chinese in France have come from northeastern China. Half the Chinese community is concentrated in Paris, which has three distinct Chinatown districts. The largest of them, in Paris’s Thirteenth District, has around 40,000, largely Indochinese immigrants working in the catering sector. But many Chinese in France also work in retail and wholesale, import-export companies, fashion manufacturing, including clothes and leather goods, and other general trades. In recent years, as cheap clothes manufacturing in Prato, Italy has cornered markets across Europe, many fashion manufacturers in Paris have started to import clothes from Italy rather than make them themselves, illustrating the interconnected transnationality of Chinese ethnic economies in Europe. There is also a large Chinese overseas student population in France of around 50,000 students (Wang and Zhang, 2008: 53).
2.1.10 Germany
Germany has one of the longest-established Chinese immigrant populations in Europe. A small community, largely of seafarers resident in ports such as Hamburg and Bremen, originated in the late nineteenth century. A new wave of Chinese immigrants has arrived from the 1980s onwards, bringing the estimated Chinese population to around 160,000 by 2008 (Li, 2011b) and probably up to 170,000 in 2011. Some 40 percent of the Chinese in Germany come from Zhejiang Province; another 40 percent come from Guangdong, including Hong Kong (Wang and Zhang, 2008). Other groups come from Fujian, Jiangsu, Shanghai and northeastern China. The largest groups of Chinese in Germany are in Berlin, Hamburg, Bonn, Frankfurt and Munich. There are also an estimated 40,000 Chinese students in Germany. In the current economic climate, Germany is a more attractive destination for Chinese immigrants with the ability to move than some of the previously more popular southern European countries.

2.1.11 Greece
Greece has a population of approximately 20,000 Chinese, coming largely from the Wenzhou area of Zhejiang Province since the 1990s. Around half the country’s Chinese live in the Metaxourgio area of Athens. Chinese operate wholesale outlets and warehouses and supply both the Chinese and the broader Greek and other immigrant populations in the country (Polyzou, 2011). Warehouses in Athens often supply tourist areas on the coast and the islands. Other Chinese businesses span retail outlets, import-export companies and general service industries such as hairdressing. The economic crisis in Greece has hit Chinese businesses hard, even though the impact has been buffered to some degree by business networks and informal business practices. Many Chinese in Greece are now looking to migrate to other parts of Europe or to new destinations, such as South Africa, in other parts of the world (Polyzou 2011, personal communication). This means that Greece’s Chinese population can be expected to decline over the next few years.

2.1.12 Hungary
Hungary has played a pivotal role in Chinese immigration into Europe, not only building up its own Chinese community but also acting as a stopping-off point for migrants to other parts of Europe. In the late 1980s, Hungary offered visa-free immigration to Chinese citizens, attracting numerous immigrants from
around China. Unlike many other European Chinese communities, where immigrants from Zhejiang or Guangdong often predominate, Chinese in Hungary do not come predominantly from one or other part of China. The largest group comes from Fujian and was estimated at around 18 percent of Hungary’s Chinese population in 2004 (Pieke, 2004: 7). Unlike other Chinese populations in Europe too, its Chinese come from across the social spectrum – urban and rural, white-collar former officials and state-owned enterprise managers. Some Chinese in the country work for the Chinese telecoms equipment giant Huawei, which opened a European supply centre in the country in 2009. The company announced in June 2011 that it will be expanding production in Hungary and setting up a new European logistics centre there (Reuters, 2011). Currently around 18,000 Chinese reside in Hungary, a figure likely to continue to rise gently.

2.1.13 Ireland
The history of Ireland’s estimated 70,000 Chinese population is closely linked to that of Chinese in the UK. As in Britain, a large proportion came from Hong Kong in the post-war period to set up restaurants and to work in the catering industry. With its economic boom in the 1990s and early 2000s, Ireland became a more attractive destination for Chinese migrants from the PRC. It is also an attractive alternative destination for Chinese students looking to improve their English or to go into higher education. With the English language widely learnt in China, Ireland is also a more attractive destination for students than other European countries, where they would have to learn another language. There are an estimated 40,000 Chinese students in Ireland, a figure likely to continue to rise, boosting the number of Chinese in the country in the years to come.

2.1.14 Italy
The Chinese population in Italy grew rapidly from around 1,000 in 1975 to 60,000 in 1995 and to an estimated 300,000 in 2008 (Li, 2011b) and 330,000 in 2011. Most of the new arrivals have come from the Wenzhou and Qingtian areas of Zhejiang Province and have settled in the larger Chinese enclaves of Milan, Prato, Florence, Turin, Venice and Naples. The largest Chinese population is in Milan, which has the third-largest Chinese population in Europe after London and Paris.
Chinese in Italy are employed predominantly in fabric and clothing or leather goods manufacturing, restaurants, import-export businesses or retail. The Chinese population in Prato, estimated to be between 30,000 and 40,000 people, is not the largest in the country but is the most noticeable given the relatively small population of the town of some 180,000 people. About 70 percent of the Chinese population come from Zhejiang, a further 15 percent from Fujian and the remainder from other parts of the country, including about 7 percent from northeastern China. Future migration is likely to be strongest to Milan over the next few years, and many Chinese look to move to European countries with a stronger economy.

2.1.15 Latvia
Latvia’s Chinese population, numbering in the hundreds, for the most part owns or works in Chinese restaurants; some work in retail and other service industries. Most arrived in Latvia in the post-Soviet period.

2.1.16 Lithuania
The Chinese population of Lithuania, estimated at 500, is relatively recent. It grew after Lithuania gained independence from the Soviet Union and particularly after it joined the European Union in 2004. However, numbers have been declining since the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008. Chinese in Lithuania operate restaurants, and a few also work in retail or in Chinese factories. The largest Chinese community is in the capital Vilnius, but there are also significant groups in other large cities.

2.1.17 Luxembourg
The estimated 1,500 Chinese in Luxembourg (Li 2011b) are closely tied to Chinese in the country’s larger neighbours France, Belgium and Germany. They work mainly in the catering industry and keep small shops.

2.1.18 Malta
The Chinese population in Malta, estimated at fewer than 100, is of little significance to Chinese immigration into Europe.

2.1.19 The Netherlands
There are between 120,000 and 160,000 Chinese people in the Netherlands, home to one of the medium-sized and longer-established Chinese populations
in Europe. According to the Chinese emigration expert Li Minghuan (2011a), the number of Chinese in the Netherlands leapt from around 2,300 in 1965 to around 30,000 in 1975, and this figure doubled again over the next decade and continued to rise. With China’s opening up and economic reform in the 1980s, many relatives of Dutch overseas Chinese from mainland China began to make the journey to Europe. Most of these immigrants came from Guangdong Province; smaller numbers came from Zhejiang Province, and the Wenzhou area in particular (Wang and Zhuang, 2010). According to official Dutch statistics, the country’s Chinese population consists of approximately 35 percent from mainland China, mainly Guangdong, Zhejiang and Fujian, 23 percent from Hong Kong and the remainder from Indonesia, Surinam and other former Dutch colonies (Wang and Zhuang, 2010:61).

2.1.20 Poland
Poland has a relatively modest Chinese population of around 2,000 people, largely immigrants from Zhejiang Province, with others from Fujian and Guangdong. Chinese immigrants started arriving in Poland in the 1990s and 2000s and generally work in restaurants and the catering industry. In June 2011, the Polish government announced plans for an illegal immigrant amnesty. It would grant temporary residence rights, including employment rights, to immigrants who have been in the country continuously since 20 December 2007 or since 1 January 2010 for those who have been refused refugee status. Although the number of Chinese immigrants affected is not huge, such initiatives in other European countries in the past have led to an influx of immigrants, including Chinese, hoping for further amnesties in the future. Consequently this initiative could lead to a steady increase in the number of Chinese immigrants in Poland over the next few years.

2.1.21 Portugal
As the former colonial ruler of Macao in southern China, Portugal has a long-standing relationship with China. The bulk of Portugal’s estimated 30,000-strong Chinese community have arrived in the country since the late 1980s. As in many other European countries, the majority of them come from Zhejiang and run shops, import-export businesses, restaurants and wholesale warehouses. Speaking better Portuguese, Chinese immigrants from Mozambique have integrated more fully into Portuguese society, finding jobs across the country’s labour market. The Chinese ethnic economy in Portugal is
closely linked with Chinese businesses elsewhere in Europe, especially in Spain, France and Italy.

2.1.22 Romania
China had good political relations with Romania in the Soviet period. But serious migration there came in the 1990s as Chinese entrepreneurs set up shops, restaurants and import-export businesses. In the 2000s, the Romanian government actually encouraged Chinese migrant workers to come to the country and make up some of the country’s labour shortages caused by the migration of Romanians to other parts of Europe. They found work in the textile industry and in shipbuilding, construction and agriculture. In 2009, however, many of them sought repatriation after losing jobs in the economic downturn. Some estimates indicate that the Chinese population may have reached as many as 40,000 in the 1990s (Green, 1998). Estimates generally put that population in the 2000s at somewhere between 4,000 and 10,000. Many Chinese have sought to return to China or to move to other parts of Europe since the 1990s owing to limited employment and economic opportunities in Romania.

2.1.23 The Slovak Republic
The Chinese immigration history of the Slovak Republic is very similar to and interconnected with that of the Czech Republic (see above). However, the overall number of Chinese immigrants in the Slovak Republic is estimated to be around one third of that in the Czech Republic.

2.1.24 Slovenia
Slovenia has only a small Chinese population, linked to the much larger Chinese population in neighbouring Italy.

2.1.25 Spain
The majority of Spain’s estimated 180,000 overseas Chinese live in its four principal cities: Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia and Alicante. The Chinese population has expanded strongly from some 21,000 in 1995 to about 168,000 by 2008 (Li 2011b). Chinese in Spain are very entrepreneurial, with a large proportion running small corner shops selling all kinds of food, groceries and household items. There is also a large wholesale supply sector supplying both
Chinese and Spanish businesses throughout the country largely with imported Chinese products.

2.1.26 Sweden
Sweden has an estimated 28,000 Chinese residents. The majority of them are ‘new migrants’ from mainland China, coming in the post-Mao reform era of the late 1980s and 1990s. Some student demonstrators sought asylum in Sweden after the crackdown in Tiananmen Square in 1989, but the majority of Chinese immigrants are economic migrants largely from Zhejiang Province. Most Chinese are involved in the catering industry but in recent years, their business interests have diversified to include import-export trade, retail and traditional Chinese medicine.

2.1.27 The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has the largest Chinese population in Europe, estimated at around 630,000. Until the 1980s, the vast majority of Chinese there were Cantonese-speakers of Hong Kong origin. But from the 1990s onwards, the UK’s Chinese population started to become more diversified as more students and immigrants from mainland China arrived. They came largely from Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong provinces. One of the main groups of Chinese immigrants in recent years has been students: they are the most numerous from any country outside the European Union. In Europe as a whole, there are an estimated 200,000 Chinese students, of whom around 80,000 are studying in the UK. It is particularly attractive to students because of the English language, the high prestige of many UK higher-education institutions and the relative ease of obtaining a one- or two-year permit to remain for employment in the country after graduation. Many UK universities now actively encourage the recruitment of Chinese students to their programmes.

Over the past five years, the UK’s Chinese ethnic economy has diversified well beyond the traditional catering sector: many second- and third-generation Chinese find employment in the mainstream UK labour market. But many new immigrants run businesses in traditional Chinese medicine, own hairdressing salons or beauty and nail parlours or engage in import and export trade or retail.
3 Emerging Issues and Factors Affecting Chinese Immigration into the EU

3.1 The impact of the global economic crisis: a general comment

An important underlying factor shaping trends in Chinese migration to and within Europe is the economic environment. In a series of global economic crises since 2008, Europe now finds itself in serious economic difficulty. Much attention is being devoted to the possibility of European countries, Greece in particular, defaulting on their national debt and to the impact of this on European banks with various degrees of exposure to that debt. As China continues to rise on the world stage, the contrast in health between the Chinese and the European economies has been accentuated. In the first half of 2012, despite slowing growth rates, China nonetheless posted economic growth of 7.8 percent (Branigan, 2012).

Chinese in Europe have shown resilience in their business operations during the economic crisis. This is due largely to their dependence on personal and family networks and informal economies. But tough economic times still affect Chinese immigrant populations. The state of the European and global economies is important for understanding Chinese migration to Europe, for three reasons:

1. Declining consumer spending and tough economic conditions for European households have a direct impact on key areas of economic activity associated with Chinese communities such as catering, fashion and general retail;
2. As European countries teeter on the edge of another recession, economies in other parts of the world are enjoying relative prosperity and growth. Not least among them, of course, is China. However, they also include the economies of Australia, where money from mining and the sale of raw materials to China and other emerging economies has kept the economy buoyant, as well as parts of Africa, South America and Asia, where Chinese are finding copious investment opportunities; and
3. As the Chinese economy races ahead, there is inevitably an impact on the relationship between overseas migrants and their home community in China.

These factors underline the importance of the economic environment to the attractiveness of different Chinese migrant destinations around the world.
Chinese populations in Europe are well known for their mobility and flexibility. They are willing to move from one country to another as necessary in order to seek out better business or employment opportunities (Pastore and Castagnone, 2011: 10–12). And people from the Wenzhou, Qingtian and Wenchang areas of Zhejiang Province, from where the vast majority of Chinese immigrants from mainland China in Europe come, are often recognised for their entrepreneurial abilities and their tendency to seek out pioneering business opportunities in new markets (Chen, 2011). Thus the deterioration of the European economic environment in recent years appears to have prompted greater migration of Chinese people between countries within the EU or from the EU to destinations such as South Africa and Brazil.

For some migrants, China’s continuing rise and economic success has meant that returning home and staying there is an increasingly attractive option. For those with the appropriate networks and resources in China, there may now be less appeal to going abroad. If opportunities are to be found closer to home, why should they travel to the other side of the world for a life of hard work and sacrifice?

But not all Chinese are in this position. For those with less social capital at home, poorer farmers for instance, the chance to make money overseas may actually seem more attractive than ever. Many poorer, less well-connected rural migrants, particularly those in areas such as Zhejiang which have a strong history of outward migration, feel increasingly left behind by the pace of rapid development in China’s large cities. They often feel that going abroad is possibly their only chance to achieve their economic and financial aims and to improve their social status (Ceccagno, 2009; Blanchard and Maffeo, 2011: 74).

At the same time, some Chinese immigrant families in Europe have to weigh up the advantages, or the appeal, particularly for parents for whom there may be new opportunities back in China, of moving back against the possible disadvantages for their children who may have been born, grown up and educated in Europe, and for whom the opportunities may be greater in Europe.

Another aspect of the European debt crisis is the increasing interest that the Chinese government has shown in buying up peripheral European debt. This came to the fore in summer 2011 with China’s negotiations to buy Italian

---

4 Indeed this has been recognised in what has become known as the ‘Wenzhou model of development’ (Liu, 1992).
government bonds worth billions of euros (Dinmore, 2011). Since the problems of the European debt crisis became evident in 2009, the Chinese government has been buying bonds in European countries, including Hungary and those considered at greater risk of default such as Spain, Greece and Italy (China Daily, 2011; Gulyas and Fletcher 2011). This growing Chinese interest in the eurozone potentially affects immigration through the indirect leverage that it gives the Chinese authorities in all kinds of negotiations with the EU or individual Member States.

3.2 The impact of immigration policy changes in some countries

Clearly immigration policies in host countries have an important impact on inbound migration. It is beyond the scope of this paper to present a detailed analysis of changes in immigration policies on a country-by-country basis. However, we can refer to some of the more significant policy issues that have affected Chinese immigration into the EU. Most notably, some countries have offered one or more illegal immigrant amnesties over the past several decades. In the 1990s, Italy offered a series of amnesties accompanying the relaxation of laws on immigration. Hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants were legalised, including large numbers of Chinese. Amnesties in 1995 and 1998, followed by changes to the immigration law in 2002, are thought to have legalised 246,000, 217,000 and 702,156 immigrants respectively (Denison et al., 2009). More recently, in 2005, Spain offered amnesties, contrary to the wishes of many of its European partners, to illegal immigrants. This followed a succession of amnesties over the previous two decades (Soothill, 2010). Other immigration policies are also important. For instance, many immigrants have seen the UK as a relatively ‘soft’ option in terms of asylum applications. Even if ultimately asylum is not granted, it can take years for the legal processes and appeals to be exhausted, in which time immigrants have often been able to work illegally, only ultimately to be given a flight home.

In recent years, however, immigration has become a hot political issue in many European countries, in many cases leading to tougher border controls and efforts to clamp down on illegal immigration. In some cases, this can also lead to high-level tension between European governments and the Chinese government. As a case in point, the Italian town of Prato, for decades a fortress of the centre-left Italian parties, has been ruled since 2009 by a centre-right
local government elected on the basis of a heavily anti-immigration, and particularly anti-Chinese-immigration, agenda. Since coming to power, the local government has sought to crackdown hard on illegal businesses, tax evasion, poor working conditions in Chinese workshops and so on. This has led to tension not only between the two sections of the local population but also between the Chinese embassy and the authorities in Rome. It is too early to assess fully the impact of such hardening attitudes on immigration trends. However, initial indications are that they may deter some immigrants from coming to Prato and encourage others to consider moving, either as individuals or businesses, elsewhere in Italy or Europe.7

As immigration has become a more sensitive political issue in some major European countries, e.g. the UK and France (see Kofman, Rogoz and Lévy, 2010), some countries have introduced stricter controls on immigration. After the UK general election in 2010, for instance, the coalition government followed through with a Conservative Party election pledge to introduce a cap on the number of immigrants coming into the country from non-EU countries. The UK authorities have also introduced a range of measures aimed at reducing both regular and irregular non-EU immigration. Among them are tighter rules for Tier 4 visa applications (UKIN, 2011a), limitations on Tier 2 intra-company transfer visas (UKIN, 2011b), the introduction of biometric residence permits for immigrants (UKIN, 2011c) and tightening language test requirements for Tier 1, 2 and 4 visa applicants (UKIN, 2011d).8

In 2006, the French government – Nicolas Sarkozy was then the minister of the interior – looked at measures intended ‘to limit family migration, encourage the highly-skilled migration, stop the illegal flows and promote integration into the French society’ (Kofman, Rogoz and Lévy, 2010: 3). Immigration continues to be a sensitive topic in the country in the aftermath of riots in 2005. Other countries looking to tighten immigration control in recent years include Denmark. It recently toughened up its immigration laws, making it harder to

7 No systematic statistical data is available yet to confirm this trend. It has only tentatively been identified by the authors of this report through interviews with Chinese immigrants and community representatives during fieldwork in Prato between May and September 2011.
8 The UK immigration system is based upon the notion of five tiers with each tier having different conditions, entitlements, and entry requirements for potential immigrants to the country. Tier 1 is for entrepreneurs, investors and graduate students, tier 2 is for skilled workers with a job offer, tier 3 for low-skilled workers meeting temporary labour shortages, tier 4 is for foreign students and tier 5 is for youth mobility and temporary workers (UKBA 2012: 5-6).
acquire a visa under family reunion rules whereby foreigners may come into the
country through marriage (Bowlby, 2011).

3.3 The transformation of the Chinese immigrant economy and community
With the wave of new immigrants from China from the 1990s onwards, new
core economic activities developed in the larger Chinese communities in
Europe, above all France, Spain and Italy. The main ones involved textile and
clothing factories, the production of leather goods, running small general shops
and the associated wholesale warehouses that make up the supply chain for
Chinese retailers and peddlers. These activities have been distributed
differently in Chinese communities across European countries. Italy has become
the centre of textiles, clothing, off-the-peg fashion and leather goods
manufacturing (Denison et al., 2009). Chinese in France, who have also been
active in these areas, have more recently turned to wholesale and retail, often
sourcing goods from Italy as well as China (Ma, 2011). Spain has always seen
more Chinese in the small retail sector (Soothill, 2010) and catering has
continued to be a dominant economic activity for Chinese in northern European
countries such as the UK, the Netherlands and Germany.

One reason for this concentration of Chinese economic activity in core sectors is
the labour trajectory of many typical Chinese immigrants, particularly those
from Zhejiang and Fujian. Newly arrived immigrants in Europe often find
themselves working long hours in tough conditions in one or other established
trade, whether in the kitchens or the fashion sweatshops, while they pay off the
debt incurred by their migration. But in these early years, as well as paying off
depts and eventually saving money, these workers are carefully learning the ins
and outs of their trade so that once they have enough money they can set up
their own business (Pastore and Castagnone, 2011: 12). Given many
immigrants’ difficulty with the host country’s language, which limits their
employment opportunities in the broader economy, Chinese labour tends to
become concentrated in these core areas.

As these sectors have become increasingly crowded with established Chinese
companies, which often come to dominate sections of the market, both new
immigrants and second-generation Chinese have started to look for alternative
business opportunities. These vary from one country to another but often include hairdressing and beauty parlours, Chinese traditional medicine shops and clinics and Chinese tea shops. In many places there is also a diversification of Chinese business activities into the mainstream economy.

For instance, according to a survey in Veneto, Italy (Zanin and Wu, 2012), manufacturing along with trade and retail became two dominant sectors in the region in the early 2000s, replacing the traditional Chinese catering sector (see Table 5).

Table 5: Development of Chinese entrepreneurs who are registered with the Trade Chambers in Veneto, 1970–2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bar/cafe/restaurant</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade/retail</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factories</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>1,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other activities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>2,903</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaboration by Valter Zanin based on data of InfoCamere, Unioncamere, Veneto, Italy (see Zanin, 2012).

Milan too has seen a transformation of the Chinese ethnic economy in the past few years. Until recently, Chinese were employed there predominantly in shops selling Chinese goods, in catering, import-export companies and wholesale; some were also in fashion manufacturing and selling. Now it is not uncommon to see traditional Italian bars, restaurants and clubs run by Chinese. Some Chinese have even cornered markets for some non-Chinese ethnic cuisines, running bars selling Latin American food to Latin American immigrants for instance (Cologna, 2011). Chinese now run wedding shops, newspaper stands, barber’s shops, tailors, grocery stores and much more. Many of these businesses are serving the general Milanese community, including Italians and immigrants of all kinds. In fact, there are indications that many Chinese, even first-generation immigrants, are changing their attitude to learning languages. Many are now learning basic conversational Italian, Arabic and Spanish because it is good for business (Cologna, 2011).

This kind of diversification is also happening elsewhere in Europe. In London, for instance, the past five years have seen a plethora of Chinese traditional
medicine shops opening across the city. Many Chinese have opened nail parlours and it is becoming usual to find Chinese hairdressers and shops selling Chinese goods. This is a significant diversification of Chinese business, for decades heavily concentrated in the catering industry.

In some countries, notably those attracting Chinese students to study abroad, there has also been a trend towards the greater diversification of the Chinese population’s educational level and employable skills. Most Chinese populations in EU Member States are still in large part immigrants of a relatively low educational level working either in labour-intensive or in service industries, e.g. fashion, wholesale or catering. But with the maturing trend for study in key European countries (see above), there has been an increase in the number of Chinese graduates and high-skilled white-collar workers in those countries. As statistical data giving a precise breakdown of Chinese populations by class, educational level and employment category is not available, it is not possible to ascertain whether this increasing number also represents an increasing proportion of the overall Chinese population in these countries. It is important as well to note that this is a less evident trend in countries with a relatively short immigration history, where there are few Chinese students and where Chinese immigrants are concentrated in the core areas of economic activity (fashion, retail, wholesale etc.) such as in Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal.

3.4 Working conditions and forced labour in some Chinese businesses

Related to both increasing social divisions and discrimination against rural migrant workers in China, poor working conditions can be found in some Chinese-owned workplaces in Europe. Zanin and Wu conducted a survey in Veneto, Italy in 2006 (Zanin and Wu, 2009) that provides a detailed comparison of working conditions between Chinese- and Italian-owned factories in the textile, garment and leather sectors. They found that despite a higher income from the former, many Chinese workers had selected or preferred to work with Italian employers, with whom they felt free from the extremely long working hours each day with no welfare and no insurance.

Another survey, conducted in the East Midlands of the UK by one of the co-authors and sponsored by the International Labour Organization, suggests not
only that irregular migrant workers are often abused and exploited in the workplace but also that some legal migrant workers with work permits such as Chinese chefs or doctors of traditional Chinese medicine may also be subjected to conditions of bonded labour and abuse. In such cases, they have their personal identity documents taken away by the labour agents who find them work or by their employers. They then have to pay either a large one-off payment or a large proportion of their monthly salary in the hope of eventually getting their documents back (Wu, Guo and Sheehan, 2010).

The issues of Chinese sweatshop labour that exist in some Chinese-owned businesses in Europe cannot be blamed merely on the bad behaviour of a few Chinese entrepreneurs. It is a more complex structural issue, related to many complicated factors, especially the characteristics of overseas Chinese communities, which are often closed, internally segmented, segregated and fragmented (Wu, 2010). As a result, the voices, needs and sufferings of exploited Chinese migrant workers are rarely heard.

Just as in recent years there have been increasing protests and labour movements in China, so a new class consciousness has emerged among new Chinese migrant workers to Europe, even though they often have only limited influence (Wu and Liu, 2013). This trend is evidenced by several developments: violence against bosses in some workplaces and workers joining local trade unions and even creating Chinese trade unions, such as the Chinese migrant network in London.

3.5 Mobility and transnationality
A distinctive characteristic of Chinese populations in Europe is their mobility and transnationality. Many Chinese stay in a place only for a few years before moving somewhere else, possibly in the same country but also often elsewhere in Europe. This mobility is especially visible within the Schengen treaty zone,
where travelling between the countries with the largest Chinese populations, such as Italy, France, Spain and the Netherlands, without a visa is possible.\(^9\)

The transnationality of Chinese immigrants in Europe – the way that they live lives that are regularly informed or shaped by relationships, connections and social practices that cross or defy national boundaries – is partly about this kind of mobility. The fact that many immigrants do not feel limited by national boundaries but extend their vision to other European countries when making choices about their life and future in relation to work, education, business or family is an indication of how their lives are transnational. And many Chinese immigrants lead lives that are transnational in other senses. Especially noteworthy are their relationships with China, often conducted through media of one form or another as discussed below, and the way in which Europe is for many just one possible destination among several. Indeed, in recent years, with the downturn in the European economy, destinations such as Africa and South America have started to look more appealing to many immigrants or would-be immigrants with a keen eye for emerging business opportunities.

The diverse opportunities available to Chinese overseas are related at least in part to China’s increasingly visible and active presence on the global stage. For example, Chinese government organisations and Chinese businesses investing in Africa, South America and Southeast Asia contribute to building up Chinese ethnic business networks in those countries. And Chinese outward direct investment, which, as we have seen, has been rising sharply in recent years, creates opportunities and markets for Chinese workers and entrepreneurs.

3.6 The second generation, the Chinese language and Chinese education

In recent years, the importance of second- or even third-generation Chinese immigrants in Europe has come to the fore. For these children, many of whom are now grown up, their relationship to China, their host community and the future of Chinese in Europe is very different from that of their parents’

---

\(^9\) In the past, countries such as Spain and Italy have organised amnesties for illegal immigrants (see above), offering them the chance to legalise and document their presence in the country. Such moves have led to surges of immigrants moving from elsewhere in Europe in order to take advantage of these opportunities. However, these surges do not account for the more mundane flow of Chinese immigrants between European countries.
Being educated in the host community;
• Speaking the local language as well as or even instead of Chinese;
• Having friends and contacts in the local community;
• Not feeling ‘at home’ in China;
• Being able to consider career choices beyond the usual options open to Chinese communities;
• Learning rather than living Chinese culture; and
• A greater willingness or ability to intermarry with non-Chinese.

These differences create quite different experiences for second- and third-generation Chinese compared to their migrant parents or grandparents. Several of them suggest why many host societies place much hope and responsibility on the shoulders of the later generations. Particularly in contexts where the Chinese community has grown rapidly over the past two or three decades, there are expectations from both Chinese and local community leaders that the younger generations will integrate more fully and more easily, that they will achieve in a broader field of businesses and the professions than their parents and that they will be social, cultural and political go-betweens creating better understanding between Chinese and local communities. The second generation is thus seen to play a fundamental role in shaping the future of Chinese communities in Europe.

The second generation is, as well as a source of hope for the future, also a source of concern among some in Chinese communities who fear the dilution of ties to China and Chinese culture. Some Europe-based Chinese journalists and community leaders have called for more attention to language and cultural education for second- and third-generation children (see, e.g. Yao, 2011). Consequently there are even greater expectations of the new generations. Not only should they hold the key to future integration and social harmony with local communities but they are also to make sure that they are appropriate flag-bearers for Chinese culture in Europe. With China’s global rise, this kind of cultural nationalism is becoming more common among Chinese commentators both at home and in Europe. For many, there is a greater sense of pride in
China’s new international standing, which also encourages greater pride in its language and culture among overseas Chinese communities.

3.7 Questions of integration and the role of new media
Questions of integration are diverse and complex across different contexts in Europe. In countries with long-established Chinese communities, e.g. France, the UK and Germany, integration of the Chinese community is often seen as less problematic than that of other immigrant populations. However, there have been signs in recent years that in those countries, second-generation Chinese are looking for higher visibility; they are no longer content with being the ‘invisible’ ethnic minority (see, e.g. www.visiblechinese.com). This phenomenon is often related largely to issues of personal identity and does not have broader policy implications.

More problematic is when large Chinese populations have arisen over a short time and are perceived to be a threat to the local economy, identity and social stability. Prato in Italy is an example, and discussions there about integration have become prominent features of local political discourse (Latham, 2011b). Prato is in many ways unique because of the size of the Chinese population (around 40,000 in a population of some 180,000) and the speed (in less than two decades) with which it has emerged. The issues of contention there include problems of perceived illegal business operations, poor observance of labour laws, associations with organised crime and fiscal evasion. These issues have been used by hostile politicians and local media to symbolise the lack of integration of Chinese people in the town, and the major contributions that the Chinese community make to the local economy and society are often ignored. Many of these issues are also relevant in other European contexts, if in less magnified ways.

The matter of ‘integration’ (or the lack of it) raises important questions about local, regional, national and ultimately European policies towards immigration. How should integration be envisaged and how should it be encouraged? How should issues of labour rights or fiscal evasion be dealt with? How can innocent people avoid becoming the scapegoats for anti-immigration sentiment? These questions and many more require robust policy positions at the European level that individual states can draw upon to support courses of action that look to enhance relations between Chinese and local communities rather than to
exacerbate them. In every case, however, it is important to understand the particular issues relating to the local community in question. Even in Italy, Prato is very different from Milan or Turin, for instance, and integration in the Netherlands or the UK raises quite different issues.

New media have great potential to influence the degree of integration of Chinese communities in Europe. They have been recognised as an important factor in diasporic identity construction and daily life among overseas Chinese for more than a decade (see, e.g. Sun, 2002; 2007). Chinese in Europe have for years been watching satellite and cable relays of China Central Television’s (CCTV) overseas channels while reading a range of Chinese-language newspapers in Europe, where there are more than a hundred Chinese-language newspaper and magazine publishers (Zhou, 2011). Chinese-language newspapers have long played a central role in providing Chinese communities with news about Chinese community leaders in Europe and also important classified advertisements for those seeking work or to buy or sell businesses or other property.

However, an ever more important feature of overseas Chinese communities in Europe is their now extensive reliance upon new media.\textsuperscript{10} New media are accompanying a transformation of the way of life of overseas Chinese communities in Europe. They open up new links to China as well as to other Chinese in Europe or other parts of the world and also offer new opportunities for business, communication, entertainment and information-gathering. Although new media have been widely available for more than a decade, there has been a major expansion of new media use in recent years. In particular, online video and broadcasting have opened up new modes of mass media consumption, e.g. online television, radio and newspapers, while social media have created new possibilities for Chinese immigrants to link up with each other for social, business or leisure purposes.

In many parts of Europe, Chinese immigrants are now watching local television stations from China, e.g. Zhejiang Television, Wenzhou Television, over the Internet. They also often access Chinese newspapers and general Chinese web portals such as Sina.com, Sohu.com or QQ.com. The Internet is also used widely

\textsuperscript{10} By ‘new media’ we refer principally to the Internet and mobile telephony although other digital media, such as DVDs, satellite television, online video and broadcasting and digital photography, are important too.
for instant messaging with other Chinese both in Europe and back in China, with QQ probably the most popular service. Some Chinese also read and write blogs and microblogs while many participate in online bulletin board system discussions. The Internet is also used widely for gathering news and information of all kinds and, perhaps most of all, as a medium for entertainment, such as online gaming, watching online television and film and downloading music.

In recent years, new media have played a big part in forming notions of identity among second-generation European Chinese. In the UK, websites such as www.dimsum.co.uk or www.britishchineseonline.com have created new spaces for reflection, dialogue and debate, information-sharing and expressions of emotional support (Song, 2011). Similar websites in other European countries have played a corresponding role. In countries such as the UK and the Netherlands, where the principal economic activity of overseas Chinese has been in the catering sector, a strong sense of community among Chinese was often lacking before the possibilities that new media offer. Chinese families, often running the one Chinese restaurant or take-away in a small town or village, had very little contact with other Chinese people. New media can thus be associated in some cases with the formation of a sense of second-generation Chinese diasporic identity (Parker and Song, 2006).

With the growing significance of new media in various aspects of identity-formation among Chinese immigrants in Europe, it is clear that new media have the potential both to link immigrants more strongly to their home communities and to detach them further from the immediate contexts of their host countries (Denison and Johanson, 2009; Johanson and Fladrich, 2011). However, Chinese immigrant media can also work to encourage better integration and affiliation with host communities (Zhou, Chen and Cai, 2006; Zhao 2006). For this reason, new media should be seen as a crucial tool in efforts to encourage greater or more harmonious integration of Chinese immigrants into their host European country.

In addition, there are high expectations among the authorities of host countries and among some Chinese themselves that second-generation Chinese will play a vital role in supporting and facilitating the integration in Europe of Chinese communities, particularly those dominated by ‘new Chinese immigrants’ (see above).
4 Conclusions, Policy Implications and Recommendations

The findings of this report have a range of policy implications for the EU and its Member States. In order to consider them, it is necessary to review the key findings and conclusions of this report. These are summarised here:

1 Chinese immigration into the EU continues to rise, and will do so in the medium term. However, its rate of growth is slowing down. This will continue owing to the worsening economic environment and the dwindling economic opportunities in some of the countries hit hardest by the financial crises surrounding the euro, notably Italy and Spain, hosts to some of the continent’s largest Chinese populations;

2 Chinese communities in Europe are constantly changing and dynamic. There is a high degree of fluidity and mobility as well as interaction among different Chinese communities in different EU Member States with higher concentrations of activity in the largest Chinese populations: the UK, France, Italy and Spain;

3 The arrival of ‘new Chinese immigrants’, principally from Zhejiang and Fujian provinces, since the 1990s, and especially in the past decade, has transformed the character of many Chinese communities in Europe in terms of skills, education, region of origin, economic activities, language and culture, and relations with home communities in China;

4 Various important trends and issues in Chinese immigration into the EU have emerged since 2000 that have important implications for the future of Chinese communities there, for relations between Chinese immigrants and local populations and for relations between China and the EU and its member countries. The key issues identified in this report for particular consideration are as follows:
   • The mixed impacts of the global and European economic crises on Chinese immigration into Europe;
   • The importance of immigration and other policy changes in different countries of the EU;
   • The continuing transformation of the Chinese business landscape and the nature of Chinese communities in many EU member countries;
   • Working conditions and forced labour in some Chinese businesses;
• The rapid growth of new media use among Chinese immigrants;
• High degrees of mobility and transnationality among Chinese communities in Europe and beyond;
• The increasing importance of Chinese professionals, highly skilled workers and international students for local Chinese community development and integration and for future relationships between EU countries and China; and
• The diversity of forms and levels of the integration of Chinese communities in Europe and the economic, social and political implications of encouraging good integration in the future; and

Recent developments in Chinese migration to the EU and its relation to China’s rise on the world stage call for further research and methodological innovation in order to develop a holistic view and in-depth understanding of the process, trends and impacts of Chinese immigration into the EU in the next 10 years.

In the light of the discussion and findings of this report, the authors make eight crucial policy recommendations:

1. EU and Member State policies related to Chinese immigration into Europe need to pay careful attention to the specific local circumstances and constitution of each Chinese community in Europe, taking into account its background, history, internal dynamics and essential characteristics;
2. At an EU level, policies need to be formulated that help and encourage Chinese integration into Member States without imposing preformed ideas as to what ‘integration’ entails. The diverse experiences of different Member States with Chinese populations, often also within a country, show that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution to questions of integration. It may be advisable for EU-level institutions to identify a range of successful examples of Chinese integration across the EU and use them as inspirational models for resolving tensions that may arise in other situations where integration has been more problematic. The EU should make available examples of best practices of community leadership, the development of good relationships with the local society, the formation of strong community identity and solidarity, and wide participation in community development;
3 The EU should encourage and support member countries in the empowerment of Chinese immigrant workers and other vulnerable groups through the establishment of various voluntary support networks and mechanisms;

4 The EU should offer centralised support to Member States looking to better exploit the potential of Chinese-language new media as a fundamental way to engage and communicate with young Chinese immigrants and second-generation Chinese. This could be of special value in contexts where integration is problematic and there are high levels of illegality. New media projects should be led from within Chinese communities but with institutional support from organisations in the host community;

5 The EU should look, wherever possible, to coordinate at the European level policies relating to Chinese immigration and to engagement with Chinese communities in Europe and should give support to Member States in their bilateral negotiations with China over immigration issues. This also means coordinating policies on immigration amnesties, border controls and the social and economic integration of Chinese immigrants into EU contexts;

6 The EU should encourage and support regular roundtable conferences for the Chinese community’s development in significant host countries. This would allow all stakeholders – including Chinese embassies and representatives of the Chinese Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, national and local governments, Chinese communities and other civil society organisations – and representatives from all groups within the Chinese community, e.g. community leaders, entrepreneurs, workers, teachers and students, to exchange views, explore areas of common concern and formulate mutually acceptable solutions to outstanding problems;

7 The EU should support university engagement with Chinese communities in its Member States and encourage university-level research that will help to enhance the positive contributions that Chinese immigration can make to the EU and its host countries. This should also include encouraging university teachers and students to participate in Chinese-community development projects; and

8 The EU should support or host, possibly through organisations such as ECRAN, a Chinese immigration forum. This would bring together policymakers, scholars, Chinese-community leaders and other stakeholders for regular annual meetings.
References


Arlt, Wolfgang (2011), Personal communication.


Denison, Tom and Johanson, Graeme (2009), ‘Community Connections: The Chinese Community in Prato, Italy, and their use of Technology’, in Graeme


Pieke, Frank (2004), ‘Chinese Globalization and Migration to Europe’, working paper 94, the Centre for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California, San Diego, March.


Yao, Yuan (2011), ‘Italian overseas Chinese who integrate into mainstream society should not throw away their Chinese culture’ [Yidali huaqiao ru zhuliu shehui bu ying fangqi zhaoguang wenhua]; accessed online at www.ouhuaitaly.com and last viewed 19 September 2011.


Zhang, Li (2008), ‘Private Homes, Distinct Lifestyles: Performing a New Middle Class’, in Li Zhang and Aihwa Ong (eds), Privatizing China: Socialism from Afar, Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.


### Appendix A: Chinese Residents in EU Countries: European Migration Network Data, 2001-09

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>8,275</td>
<td>8,765</td>
<td>8,925</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3,845</td>
<td>4,472</td>
<td>6,011</td>
<td>6,883</td>
<td>7,283</td>
<td>7,452</td>
<td>8,027</td>
<td>8,254</td>
<td>7,811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>3,772</td>
<td>3,239</td>
<td>2,976</td>
<td>2,923</td>
<td>2,478</td>
<td>3,311</td>
<td>3,703</td>
<td>4,484</td>
<td>4,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2,086</td>
<td>2,372</td>
<td>2,613</td>
<td>2,992</td>
<td>3,382</td>
<td>3,978</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>73,767</td>
<td>75,733</td>
<td>78,096</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>5,819</td>
<td>6,840</td>
<td>6,420</td>
<td>6,790</td>
<td>6,856</td>
<td>8,584</td>
<td>8,979</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5,842</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>73,767</td>
<td>75,733</td>
<td>78,096</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>69,620</td>
<td>86,738</td>
<td>111,712</td>
<td>127,822</td>
<td>144,885</td>
<td>156,519</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1,334</td>
<td>1,393</td>
<td>1,438</td>
<td>1,468</td>
<td>1,503</td>
<td>1,503</td>
<td>1,540</td>
<td>1,544</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>7,997</td>
<td>9,395</td>
<td>11,223</td>
<td>13,330</td>
<td>14,662</td>
<td>15,007</td>
<td>15,266</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>3,390</td>
<td>7,395</td>
<td>8,539</td>
<td>9,084</td>
<td>9,674</td>
<td>9,441</td>
<td>10,576</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>1,198</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>28,693</td>
<td>37,651</td>
<td>34,378</td>
<td>56,916</td>
<td>79,164</td>
<td>100,608</td>
<td>107,899</td>
<td>125,008</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>78,000</td>
<td>88,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>87,747</td>
<td>163,239</td>
<td>142,992</td>
<td>241,717</td>
<td>369,181</td>
<td>446,668</td>
<td>468,826</td>
<td>467,337</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Appendix B: Chinese Residents in EU Countries: Eurostat Data, 2001-10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5,122</td>
<td>6,478</td>
<td>7,605</td>
<td>8,275</td>
<td>8,765</td>
<td>8,925</td>
<td>9,306</td>
<td>9,664</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>6,016</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>8,254</td>
<td>8,328</td>
<td>8,670</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2,976</td>
<td>3,239</td>
<td>2,923</td>
<td>2,838</td>
<td>3,331</td>
<td>3,703</td>
<td>4,484</td>
<td>4,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>5,976</td>
<td>5,156</td>
<td>5,866</td>
<td>6,840</td>
<td>7,101</td>
<td>7,050</td>
<td>7,040</td>
<td>5,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>6,220</td>
<td>6,114</td>
<td>6,568</td>
<td>7,213</td>
<td>7,366</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2,096</td>
<td>2,381</td>
<td>2,625</td>
<td>2,992</td>
<td>3,382</td>
<td>3,703</td>
<td>3,978</td>
<td>4,620</td>
<td>5,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>77,306</td>
<td>76,743</td>
<td>71,639</td>
<td>73,737</td>
<td>80,574</td>
<td>83,264</td>
<td>83,737</td>
<td>85,260</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>6,940</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>6,425</td>
<td>6,794</td>
<td>6,863</td>
<td>8,594</td>
<td>8,988</td>
<td>10,228</td>
<td>10,719</td>
<td>11,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>69,738</td>
<td>111,712</td>
<td>127,822</td>
<td>144,885</td>
<td>156,519</td>
<td>170,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>12,183</td>
<td>13,330</td>
<td>14,662</td>
<td>15,007</td>
<td>15,266</td>
<td>16,210</td>
<td>18,121</td>
<td>19,758</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>3,707</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>4,771</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>10,797</td>
<td>10,982</td>
<td>13,400</td>
<td>14,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1,897</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1,897</td>
<td>1,898</td>
<td>1,898</td>
<td>1,898</td>
<td>1,898</td>
<td>1,898</td>
<td>1,898</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>1,198</td>
<td>1,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>23,400</td>
<td>29,709</td>
<td>42,095</td>
<td>57,094</td>
<td>79,164</td>
<td>100,608</td>
<td>107,899</td>
<td>125,008</td>
<td>147,539</td>
<td>155,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5,355</td>
<td>5,675</td>
<td>6,171</td>
<td>6,676</td>
<td>8,860</td>
<td>7,737</td>
<td>9,441</td>
<td>11,817</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>42,859</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>55,188</td>
<td>67,930</td>
<td>77,868</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>78,000</td>
<td>88,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>78,383</td>
<td>40,518</td>
<td>322,677</td>
<td>335,529</td>
<td>454,347</td>
<td>431,732</td>
<td>479,130</td>
<td>535,947</td>
<td>496,969</td>
<td>521,228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Consortium partners:

Steinbeis  
CHATHAM HOUSE

The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of ECRAN or the European Union.